There aren’t many cases in recent sports history where a player has come off of an MVP season with their fans having less faith in them moving forward. But Joel Embiid’s Sixers picked up a lot of baggage on his long and winding road to that honor, and the bitter taste of Philly’s Game 7 defeat to Boston has not gone away. Dazzling as his numbers have been in the regular season, Embiid has been unable to come close to that production when it counts, even if we afford him some benefit of the doubt as a result of injuries.

So we’re starting from a weird place late in the offseason — coming off of two years leading the league in scoring, Joel Embiid should score less in 2023-24.

For good reason, James Harden has been the center of Philadelphia’s offseason story, and the star guard’s angst could derail not just this season but the franchise’s future. But so long as he is in a Sixers uniform, Embiid’s evolution as a player will define the team’s championship upside. And with that being the case, the best thing for the Sixers might be Embiid de-emphasizing the skills that earned him the NBA’s top individual honor last season.

Facilitating Maxey’s growth

The Harden situation dragging on makes a big Tyrese Maxey leap basically required for a good Sixers season. Barring a miraculous turnaround, the best-case scenario with Harden is getting him to buy in for another year out of respect for his teammates before the sides part ways next offseason. In most realistic outcomes, they’ll either deal with a rocky season this year or trade him for a package of players and picks that will leave a creative dearth on the roster.

A lot has been said about Maxey’s creative limitations when projecting his value moving forward, with most of the criticism fair. He’s a small-ish guard with defensive limitations who has been at his best serving as a pure scorer next to a volume playmaker. Sliding him into the lead guard spot is easier said than done.

On the other hand, no one would claim Maxey is leaving developmental money on the table, with his work effort celebrated around the organization. It doesn’t seem unfair to claim that his growth to date has bought him the ability to go to his teammates and ask what they can do to help him grow into a bigger, featured role. No one is in a better position to do so than Embiid.

While Embiid has proven more capable in the pick-and-roll than many believed he was pre-Harden, it’s almost misleading to refer to a standard Embiid action as either rolling or popping. Most ball screens end with Embiid gliding toward the elbow and setting up to attack from the nail, basically a half-roll. Devastating as he has been from that spot, it means he is not offering “vertical spacing” as a rim runner as often as many high-profile bigs.

This is reflected in his shot profile. Just like Embiid, Nikola Jokic begins a lot of possessions at the top of the key or around the elbows, but it’s much rarer for a Jokic scoring possession to end there:

As a scorer, Embiid can justify operating around the free-throw line because he has been efficient at high-volume there. But windows that guards might have to pass through in a standard pick-and-roll might not appear with Embiid in that spot and the corresponding defenders aligned accordingly. Help at the rim isn’t as necessary.

Harden can work around smaller and less frequent openings because he’s a creative and prolific playmaker. For Maxey, the floor alignment is a bit more meaningful, and it leaves him with fewer opportunities for passes in his wheelhouse as he tries to expand on his ability to hit skip passes and more advanced reads around the floor.

Before P.J. Tucker eventually turned into a stationary corner man, the Sixers did some interesting things with him early last season, combining that with hard rolls for Embiid. A brush screen from Tucker here gives Maxey breathing room on the perimeter and creates some uncertainty near the paint, which leads to an easy dunk for Embiid:

The value in the roll is less about the finish of this specific play and more about the discomfort it causes for the defense. 10-15 genuine rim runs in a game will open passing lanes for Maxey out to the perimeter, setting up reads for the guard beyond the strong side kick-outs he’s most comfortable making. And with finishing amongst the trees an occasional problem for Maxey, keeping the big stuck on a rolling Embiid will give Maxey cleaner looks at the rim on runners, floaters, and layup attempts.

Playing with pace without having to run

Embiid’s teams become so reliant on him creating something out of nothing in long, stagnant possessions that backup plans often aren’t viable by round two of the playoffs. With eight seconds on the shot clock and a possession moving nowhere fast, good teams have figured out to load up against Embiid in the middle of the floor, which he can reward with reckless dribbling or poor shot selection. This specific issue has been amplified by the presence of Harden, who brings great offensive value but pounds the air out of the ball quite often.

Pace is not necessarily a measure of good and bad. Playing slow did not impact Philadelphia’s offensive efficiency on a macro scale, with the Embiid/Harden/Maxey triumvirate powering one of the league’s best offenses in 2022-23. Last year’s NBA finalists, the Nuggets and Heat, ranked in the bottom-six in overall pace during the regular season and bottom-four during the playoffs. But breaking down pace into smaller subcategories shows just how slow the Sixers are/were:

• The Sixers were dead last in total time per possession in the playoffs (16.5 seconds on average, about a full second slower than both Miami and Denver)
• The Sixers were the slowest team in the playoffs out of dead-ball situations (made shots and dead-ball turnovers), with an average possession time of 19.7 seconds
• The Sixers were 19th out of 20 teams in possession time after a defensive rebound (13.5 seconds, almost two full seconds slower than the Nuggets). The only team slower was the Pelicans, who only appeared in a single play-in game
• The Sixers did slightly better on possessions after live-ball turnovers, clocking in at 14th.

In the playoffs, when shot-making can falter and defenses are better, being able to get to a counter or an additional read can be invaluable, and the Sixers frequently punted on that chance. “Playing fast” isn’t blindly sprinting down the floor at every opportunity. It’s making quick decisions as the ball hits your hands, knowing where your second and third reads are, and releasing the ball if it’s stagnant too long, allowing the people around you to find their own rhythm.

So where can Embiid’s team change? Sticking with the Nuggets, Maxey has the pace and touch to follow the path of someone like Jamal Murray, zipping around screens and his star big man until the man chasing him simply can’t take it anymore. Frankly, he’s already ahead of where Murray was at the same age in some areas, with far superior outside shooting on higher volume than age-22 Murray.

Movement guards playing off of Embiid have had fruitful relationships with him. We have seen Embiid work well in two-man combinations on the wings, with JJ Redick and Seth Curry turning in career-best work in partnerships with Embiid. Those two are meaningfully different, too, with Curry a slower, more methodical guard vs. Redick’s frenetic movement and constant cutting.

Maxey is a gargantuan downhill upgrade compared to those two and has become one of the best shooters in the league, full-stop. This combo play from Embiid and Maxey in Game 5 vs. Boston is an example of where they can take things at their best, attacking with pace and then releasing when resistance arrives:

On Embiid’s end, there should be an element of example-setting for the group behind his passing, too. An offense with Embiid moving the ball quicker and spending less time jab-stepping and pump-faking gives fewer excuses to the rest of the group. Think Tobias Harris when he gets a mid-post possession, or Harden walking the ball up the floor. Every champion comes away preaching the importance of trust and unity, and the best way to create that is by making an active and intentional effort to spread the wealth.

A focus on defense and rebounding

In a recent appearance on Patrick Beverley’s podcast, Nick Nurse touched on a pair of subjects that caught my attention. First, on Joel Embiid’s role defensively:

“First and foremost, I hate to be boring and start at the defensive end, but I’m going to really expect a lot more rim protection from him. I would say that would be where I’m going to start at. We’re going to probably let our aggressive guards be really aggressive and funnel a lot of things to him. I am expecting that, I always say like, he’s gonna take more swings at blocked shots.”

Then, a piece of discussion about Paul Reed:

“He’s got an incredible nose for the basketball like I got a lot of time for guys that can go get the ball. The ball is pretty important. He really can go get it and even when he doesn’t, he just misses it about 25 times a game where you think he’s gonna get it…Will he play with Embiid? For sure. Like I don’t think that’s a question. He’s gonna be out there playing hard. He’s gonna be defending. He’s gonna be doing probably more than he’s done before. I think he’s ready to take a step up. He can play.”

Those pieces together are interesting for the Sixers because turning Embiid into a more free-swinging player makes rebounding a bigger challenge. That’s where someone like Reed might come in, or if it’s Reed flying in from the weak side for block attempts, it’s Embiid who has to end possessions with glass cleaning.

The Sixers were a slightly better rebounding team than you think last season — they were middle of the pack in defensive rebounding percentage during the regular season but elite in their 11 playoff games, second overall for the postseason. That said, so many of their worst defeats came as a result of losing those battles on the margins, with transition defense and rebounding looming large. And rebounding is an area where Embiid has dropped off in the postseason, with the big man averaging fewer than 10 rebounds a night in 3/5 second-round losses.

Personally, I think finishing possessions is the main area where Embiid leaves money on the table. He’s strong as hell and has the length to beat out anybody, but his technique is often sloppy, his focus fades in and out, and he doesn’t attack the ball as aggressively as he could. He still pulls down a lot of boards, but last year was his worst year on the glass arguably ever, with his rate stats and averages all down.

And there’s an even bigger challenge to consider for the postseason — Embiid needs to be a viable, possession-by-possession defender who can handle perimeter switches. He has long been impressive in isolated possessions against stars and is an all-world rim protector, but the Sixers have never stuck with 1-5 switching as a base concept for good reason. Jayson Tatum put a dagger through his heart in Game 7 up in Boston this year, punishing Embiid’s inability to keep up away from the rim.

I actually think this goes beyond scoring less and requires something more drastic: a physical transformation. Embiid is in great shape now compared to his early days, and repeated injuries basically guarantee he won’t reclaim the springs he had entering the league. But a lighter, sleeker Embiid could offer better foot speed in space, increased ability to slide around bodies to attack the glass, and slightly more gas in the tank late in games. Maybe it means less weight to throw around on the block, but that feels like a worthwhile trade.

Turning Philadelphia into a faster team less reliant on Embiid for offense starts here. When the guards and wings can release on a missed shot and trust that Embiid will end a possession, it leads to moments like these:

The Sixers have talent around Embiid who can score and take some of the burden off of him, but they have no one who can lift the team up as he can by controlling the defensive end, owning that responsibility like it’s the most important that he has. Despite Embiid’s desire to win individual honors, I still believe winning is the most important thing for him, and it may take a re-focus of his attention to help the Sixers break out of second-round stasis.